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How is human social intelligence engaged in the course of ordinary conversation? Standard 
models of conversation hold that language production and comprehension are guided by 
constant, rapid inferences about what other agents have in mind. However, the idea that 
mindreading is a pervasive feature of conversation is challenged by a large body of evidence 
suggesting that mental state attribution is slow and taxing, at least when it deals with 
propositional attitudes such as beliefs. Belief attributions involve contents that are decoupled 
from our own primary representation of reality; handling these contents has come to be seen as 
the signature of full-blown human mindreading. However, mindreading in cooperative 
communication does not necessarily demand decoupling. We argue for a theoretical and 
empirical turn towards “factive” forms of mentalizing here. In factive mentalizing, we monitor 
what others do or do not know, without generating decoupled representations. We propose a 
model of the representational, cognitive, and interactive components of factive mentalizing, a 
model that aims to explain efficient real-time monitoring of epistemic states in conversation. 
After laying out this account, we articulate a more limited set of conversational functions for 
nonfactive forms of mentalizing, including contexts of meta-linguistic repair, deception, and 
argumentation. We conclude with suggestions for further research into the roles played by 
factive versus nonfactive forms of mentalizing in conversation. 
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The capacity for human beings to thrive and flourish is intimately linked to the capacity for 
complex forms of coordination and communication (Tomasello, 2019; Vygotsky, 1980). Among 
different cognitive capacities supporting human interaction, few have occasioned more 
disagreement than mentalizing (or mindreading, as we shall also refer to it), our ability to track 
the underlying psychological causes of behavior (Carruthers & Smith, 1996). Some researchers 
see mentalizing as a ubiquitous feature of social interaction, underpinning everything from 
communication (Scott-Phillips, 2014) to moral judgment (Young & Waytz, 2013). Others argue 
that the role of mindreading has been greatly exaggerated, assigning it a sharply limited function 
(Andrews, 2012; Gallagher, 2001; Heyes, 2018; Zawidzki, 2013). They credit human social 
success to various other capacities, from low-level “submentalizing” processes (Heyes, 2014) to 
more specialized abilities such as trait recognition and stereotyping (Andrews, 2012). Thus, 
depending on who you ask, mentalizing is either the core of the explanation of how human 
beings navigate the social world, or else an overblown distraction from the real story. 
Nowhere is this dynamic clearer than when cognitive scientists debate the psychological 
underpinnings of one of our most striking forms of social interaction: conversation. According to 
a broadly influential framework traceable to the work of H.P. Grice (Grice, 1975), conversation 
is mentalistic through and through (Clark & Marshall, 1981; D. W. Harris, 2019; Heritage, 
2012a; Sperber & Wilson, 2002). In this framework, whether conversational partners are making 
inferences about speaker meaning, selecting and interpreting referring expressions, or trying to 
figure something out together, they are constantly engaged in the task of monitoring and 
updating representations of each other’s mental states. Consequently, the Gricean view entails 
that mentalizing has a number of fairly specific cognitive properties: To match the speed of 
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ordinary conversation, mentalistic inferences and adjustments must occur in an extremely rapid, 
online fashion. To handle the wide array of different contents that we must represent in order to 
communicate effectively, conversational mentalizing must be highly flexible and have access to 
a wide array of stored information and propositional reasoning processes. To match the 
phenomenology of everyday conversation, these mentalistic processes must occur unconsciously 
and without significant cognitive effort. 
This picture conflicts with a widespread view within the anti-mentalistic camp: 
mentalizing is hard. The kind of mentalizing that involves propositional contents is thought to be 
cognitively effortful in ways that make it an unlikely basis for everyday social interaction 
(Bermudez, 2003; Butterfill & Apperly, 2013; Moore, 2017; Zawidzki, 2013). Researchers on 
this side of the debate point to a large empirical literature showing that performance on standard 
developmental measures of mindreading is reliably correlated with measures of executive 
functioning (Devine & Hughes, 2014). The picture of mindreading that emerges from this body 
of work shows a slow and taxing form of cognition that is ill-suited to the demands of everyday 
conversation. Anti-mentalistic models of conversation consequently relegate mindreading to a 
minor, supporting role, for example, as a device for repairing certain kinds of misunderstandings 
(Apperly, 2018; Pickering & Garrod, 2004; Shintel & Keysar, 2009). These proposals are 
challenged, however, by a wide array of evidence indicating that speakers are sensitive to 
information about speakers’ mental states from the very earliest stages of language production 
and comprehension (Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Hanna et al., 2003; Heller et al., 2012; Rubio-
Fernández et al., 2019). It is not obvious how to reconcile this latter research with the evidence 
suggesting that mindreading is slow and cognitively demanding. It would seem, then, that 
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mentalizing both cannot and yet somehow does play a significant role in the cognitive 
underpinnings of conversation. 
This puzzling standoff about what is happening in conversation motivates a fresh look at 
the kind of mentalizing that involves propositional contents. We argue that there are actually two 
kinds of mentalizing at work here: Factive mentalizing, which is relatively easy and pervasive in 
conversation, and nonfactive mentalizing, which is relatively difficult and rare. Factive 
mentalizing is employed when we represent others as either knowing or failing to know about 
some aspect of reality. Nonfactive mentalizing governs the attribution of beliefs whose contents 
are decoupled from the attributor’s larger representation of what is real, which we will refer to as 
their primary representation. Re-examining empirical work from both sides of the divide, we 
find that research establishing the difficulty of mental state attribution describes nonfactive 
mentalizing, where research establishing its pervasiveness focuses on factive mentalizing. The 
depth of this distinction has been missed because the signature feature of the harder kind of 
mentalizing—“decoupling”—has been mistaken for the mark of genuine mental state attribution 
as such. This confusion has arisen in part because tests involving decoupling have had such a 
prominent role in measures of mentalizing, and in part because as theorists, we always have the 
option of taking a decoupled perspective. However, the kind of mentalizing that underpins most 
conversational activity is powerful and pervasive exactly because it forbids decoupling: Typical 
cooperative conversations are expected to be mutually informative, in a way that simply aligns 
the task of figuring out what is real with the task of figuring out what the other person has in 
mind. Seeing others as knowledgeable enables us to take what they say at face value without 
further reasoning: It is exactly in virtue of having this as our default setting in cooperative 
conversations that these conversations are an efficient way of pooling knowledge. Mentalizing in 
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conversation is important because we do need to represent epistemic disparities in order to ask 
questions that our conversational partners are well-positioned to answer, and to avoid telling 
them what they already know; however, these basic conversational abilities demand committed 
rather than decoupled forms of mental state attribution. 
Our reexamination of the status of decoupling in mental state attribution and 
communication is grounded in the distinction between factive (knowledge-oriented) and 
nonfactive (belief-oriented) mentalizing. In recent years, a number of theorists have argued that 
knowledge attribution is ontogenically, phylogenically, and cognitively prior to belief attribution, 
and should play a more central role in our theories of mindreading (Nagel, 2017; Phillips et al., 
2020; Phillips & Norby, 2019). We extend these earlier proposals in several ways. By giving an 
account of the key mindreading distinction in terms of decoupling, we provide a cognitive 
mechanism that shows why it is that knowledge attribution is prior to belief attribution, and how 
these different types of mental state attribution are represented. We also explain how factive 
mentalizing enables us to engage in fast and efficient mindreading in cooperative conversational 
contexts.  Finally, we offer a theoretical proposal about conversational contexts that do require 
nonfactive mentalizing, including repair, strategic deception, and argumentation.  
From the outset we should be clear that even outside of these special contexts, mindreading 
involves much more than the detection of knowledge and belief: a full treatment of mindreading 
in conversation would have to cover attributions emotional and motivational states as well. 
Explaining these processes falls outside the scope of our current project. In what follows, we 
focus on attributions of epistemic states; explaining how these states are tracked in conversation 
is no small matter. 
[Box 1] 
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2. Two kinds of propositional attitude attribution  
2.1. The significance of decoupling 
It is famously hard to tell whether a response to a situation involving an agent reflects a grasp of 
that agent’s mental states. When shown a video of a man struggling to obtain out-of-reach 
bananas, or struggling to unlock a cage, Premack and Woodruff’s chimpanzee Sarah was able to 
select a photo showing the appropriate tool for the job; they took this to indicate her sensitivity to 
the agent’s state of mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Critics were swift to point out that 
Sarah’s selections could also be explained by her primary grasp of the environmental 
problems—distant bananas, a locked door—without reference to the agent. They advocated a test 
introducing some contrast between the environment and the mental states of the observed agent, 
such as a false belief task in which the observed agent’s representation of the location of some 
reward is at odds with the current fact of the matter (Dennett, 1978; Harman, 1978).  
When there is a clash between the content of the observed agent’s belief and the 
observer’s primary representation of reality, the observer who correctly anticipates the deceived 
agent’s action does show some real evidence of grasping that agent’s state of mind (Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983). To anticipate the reasoned behaviour of the observed agent, the observer must 
represent the content of that agent’s mental state in a way that decouples this clashing content 
from the observer’s primary, action-guiding representation of the world. With this content 
quarantined from the content of observer’s own commitments, the observer can use both streams 
of content to reason separately about what is going on in the world, and about how the agent will 
act (Leslie 1987). But even if situations involving recognizably mistaken agents, and 
consequently decoupled contents, serve as particularly good tests for propositional mental state 
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attribution, this is not to say that all propositional mental state attributions must involve 
decoupled contents.  
Confusion over this point dates back to the 1980s. Alan Leslie lists it as a defining 
characteristic of proposition-embedding mental state terms that they take decoupled content. 
According to Leslie, “propositions involving mental state terms do not logically imply the truth 
(or falsehood) of propositions embedded in them. Thus “John believes the cat is white” says 
nothing about whether or not the cat really is white. Again, one cannot look through the 
embedded proposition to the world” (Leslie, 1987, p. 416). Leslie is right about the opacity of 
“believe” (and “expect”, the other epistemic state he mentions in this context), but his rule does 
not cover all mental state terms. One important class of proposition-embedding mental state 
terms, namely factives (e.g. know, be aware, see that), is distinguished exactly by requiring the 
speaker’s commitment to the truth of their embedded propositions (Kiparsky & Kiparsky, 
1970).1 For reasons of generality, in what follows we will focus primarily on know, the most 
general factive mental state term; all other factive mental states entail knowing (Williamson, 
2000). In contrast to parallel sentences involving nonfactives such as believe, think, and expect, a 
sentence such as “John knows the cat is white” does commit the speaker to the cat’s being white. 
Factive mental state attributions are transparent, in the sense that the attributor looks through 
them to the world. The attributor may of course be mistaken, taking someone to know something 
 
1 Philosophers and linguists have slightly different understandings of this requirement, generating an 
interdisciplinary discrepancy in the meaning of the term “factive”: linguists typically define it in terms of 
presupposition, while philosophers focus on entailment. This terminological difference matters for communicative 
expressions like “is right that”, which entail but do not presuppose their embedded contents, but it seems that all 
mental state expressions that entail their complements also presuppose them (Anand & Hacquard, 2014), so for 
present purposes we can adhere to the stricter philosophical understanding of the term. For discussion, see (Nagel 
2017).   
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that it is not actually a fact, but the meaning of an attribution of knowledge crucially includes the 
attributor’s commitment to the embedded content.  
Subsequent researchers have followed Leslie’s initial line of insisting on a very strong 
connection between decoupled content and fully mature propositional mental state attribution. 
On Michael Tomasello’s view of “propositional attitude constructions”, these always involve 
“the coordination of three perspectives—yours, mine and the objective perspective” (Tomasello, 
2018, p. 8492). In his view, to grasp a propositional attitude (“He believes that the cat is sick”) is 
a matter of recognizing that there is some fact of the matter about the embedded content (“i.e. the 
cat is or is not objectively sick”), and furthermore to grasp that “this is independent of the 
attitude about the fact that the speaker expresses in the main clause.” Again, this independence 
condition does indeed apply to attributions of nonfactive propositional attitudes like belief, 
which can take decoupled content, but it does not apply to factive attitudes. For the speaker who 
says, “he knows that the cat is sick,” there is no independence between the attitude ascribed in 
the main clause and the truth of the embedded content; the factive verb locks in the speaker’s 
commitment to what is said to be known.   
Tomasello expresses no doubts about the mainstream view that factive verbs such as 
“know” govern committed rather than decoupled content. Having drawn a tight connection 
between perspective-taking and decoupled content, what Tomasello denies is that knowledge 
attributions involve genuine perspective-taking. In his view, states of “seeing, hearing, knowing” 
are identified as “nonperspectival intentional states” (Tomasello, 2019, p. 52). There is 
something odd about this classification: seeing, for example, might be thought of as the 
perspectival state par excellence, in that what we see is a function of spatial position and 
orientation, and appropriate attributions of states of seeing must track those relationships. 
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Tomasello’s theory classifies factive states (or “epistemic states” in his terminology) as 
nonperspectival because it employs a special sense of “perspectival” in which recognition of 
another’s perspective always demands a three-way comparison between self, other, and reality, 
with the attributor attending separately to each (2018, 2019, p. 64). In this picture, the task of 
monitoring reality is always quarantined from the task of monitoring the (always potentially 
mistaken) perspectival states of others, and the perspectival states of others are to be understood 
in contrast with one’s own. 
Indeed, Tomasello insists that even one’s own mental states are properly decoupled from 
reality, given a mature human understanding of perspective. He makes this point in connection 
with the unwitnessed transfer task, in which an object is moved from a drawer to a cabinet when 
the observed agent’s back is turned. The mature mindreader understands not only that the 
observed agent is mistaken about the location of the target object; in Tomasello’s view, “a fully 
adult-like understanding would include the proviso that the [subject] herself might potentially be 
wrong: perhaps the cabinet has a false bottom or someone has tricked her” (2018, p. 8492). 
Mature tracking of perspective, on this view, requires chronic representation of the possibility of 
slippage between what is real and what is represented, both by others and by oneself. In a more 
naïve take on the transfer task, the observed agent has a false belief about the location of the 
object, while the observing child knows where it is; with Tomasello’s proviso in place, the child 
is no longer simply characterized as knowing. Rather, “the child’s best guess is that the objective 
situation matches her own belief (because she has good evidence, and the agent has misleading 
evidence)” (2018, p. 8493). Where the naïve attribute knowledge, the sophisticated attribute at 
most a best guess. 
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There are costs to demoting knowledge attribution to this second-class status. Even if in 
theory, adults have the option of decoupling or raising doubts about any particular judgment, we 
are in practice selective about exercising that option. Corpus data suggest that adults attribute 
knowledge frequently, with “know” appearing as one of the most common verbs in spoken 
language, outstripping “think” and “believe” (Davies, 2008). One might take knowledge 
attribution to be an immature or restricted form of evaluation that adults employ when they lack 
the time or resources to consider multiple ways of seeing something. Our alternative proposal is 
that both factive and nonfactive mental state attributions are fully mature, but different in 
function: our selectivity with decoupling serves a valuable purpose. The next section aims to 
explain when adults decouple and distance themselves from the contents of attributed 
propositional attitudes, and when they commit.  
2.2. Decoupling and committing  
In classic false belief tasks, the observer is looking down on the deceived agent from a position 
of epistemic superiority, and simply anticipating or reporting that agent’s misconception (as 
opposed to correcting it, the more natural response in cooperative interaction). But participants in 
ordinary cooperative conversations are as often looking up as looking down, as they switch 
between the roles of asking and telling. Whenever the two people in a conversational interaction 
differ in whether they know some proposition, there is what we might call an epistemic gradient 
between them, to use John Heritage’s (2012a) terminology, and mentalizing is useful whether 
one is at the top or the bottom of that gradient. Indeed, mentalistic models of conversation insist 
that representing a conversational partner as in the more or less knowledgeable position, relative 
to oneself, is crucial to the structure of conversation, determining whether one is in a position to 
ask or tell (Heritage, 2012a, 2012b). In the simple asymmetry of interaction, every moment of 
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epistemic superiority for one side in an interaction is a moment of inferiority for the other, so it is 
worth examining the kind of mentalizing we can do in both positions.  
Epistemic subordinates take themselves to know less on the relevant point than their 
conversational partners do. Given that factive mental state attributions involve a commitment on 
the attributor’s side to the content of the other person’s state of mind, it might sound odd to say 
that subordinates can be committed to the content of the superior’s state of mind. However, by 
representing you as possessing propositional knowledge which I lack (“what time is the meeting 
tomorrow?”), I am motivated to ask you, using your state of mind to serve as my guide to reality. 
In mentalistic models of conversation, question-asking behavior is guided by just this type of 
mentalizing; section 4 below explores attributions of knowledge-wh in more detail.  
When our questions are answered, ordinarily we update our models of the world directly, 
consistent with our initial factive mental state attributions representing the addressee as knowing 
the answer to the question. This is our default conversational stance of trust, in which we 
represent no possibility of divergence between what is said and how things are: You are assumed 
to know, to be expressing the kind of state of mind that one has only towards truths. Of course, it 
is possible to take a more cautious approach: I could suspect that you might be mistaken, or 
might be attempting to ensure that I arrive late to the meeting, but note that this type of stance 
would make it puzzling why I asked you in the first place. Decoupling also leaves the question 
unresolved, so further research would be needed to settle my own epistemic state. We cannot 
directly gain propositional knowledge testimonially unless we represent our conversational 
informants as knowing (McDowell, 1994). 
In practice, we can switch from trusting to decoupling when the content of a 
conversational partner’s answer lies outside the range of what we would take on trust, prompting 
MINDREADING IN CONVERSATION 
13 
 
a re-evaluation of the attributed mental state or its expression: If you tell me that the meeting is at 
5am, I will have second thoughts about whether you know, or hear you as joking. But one of the 
difficulties with theorizing about decoupling is that it is always possible in principle, at least 
from the perspective of the theoretician who is not immediately charged with the task of figuring 
out when the meeting is happening: Looking at virtually any situation involving an agent, we can 
consider hypothetical or frankly counterfactual possibilities of divergence between the agent’s 
state of mind and the environment. One reason why decoupling is always possible is explained 
by the philosophical orthodoxy that knowing entails believing: If it is true that Bill knows that 
the meeting is at noon, then it is also true that Bill believes that the meeting is at noon (Ichikawa 
& Steup, 2018). The fact that all states of knowledge are states of belief means that when we 
detect a state of knowledge in another person, this state could also accurately, if less 
informatively, be classified as a state of belief. We could choose to regard Bill’s mental state as a 
condition local to him, in abstraction from what is going on in the larger world. If we see Bill 
just as believing that the meeting is at noon, then we are not accepting a falsehood, but we are 
doing something like overfitting our data, reducing the predictive power of our mental state 
attribution, and refusing the informational gain available from a knowledgeable conversational 
partner. Recognizing others as knowing more than we do enables us to interpret their statements 
and behavior as reflective of the larger reality. 
Factive mental state attribution is useful not only when others know more than we do, but 
also when they know less. If I can see that your view of an event is obstructed, I do not need to 
reason about what you might believe is happening in order to see you as failing to know. While it 
is possible for me to think about what decoupled content you might be entertaining, it is not 
necessary, and indeed mentalistic models of conversation take typical acts of telling to be 
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motivated just by a sense that the other party lacks knowledge on a given point (Heritage 2012a, 
2012b).  
3. Coupled and decoupled mentalizing  
Nonfactive forms of mindreading are not just functionally redundant in conversational contexts: 
We suggest that they are also cognitively costly in ways that factive mindreading is not. This 
cost is a direct consequence of the tight relationship between nonfactive mindreading and 
representational decoupling; indeed, coordinating between two decoupled sets of representations 
is precisely why many researchers believe that mindreading is hard (Fizke et al., 2014). 
Decoupled mentalizing seems to draw upon our limited executive resources in multiple ways 
(Devine & Hughes, 2014): Maintaining mental representations of another’s beliefs alongside 
one’s own is thought to place demands on working memory (Carlson et al., 2002); suppressing 
our primary representations while making use of the decoupled ones requires inhibitory control 
(Benson & Sabbagh, 2009); and switching back and forth between one set of representations and 
another requires cognitive flexibility (Jacques & Zelazo, 2005). All of this makes nonfactive 
forms of mentalizing an especially effortful mode of social cognition. 
Figure 1 
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While decoupled mindreading is required for belief attribution, it is not required for 
knowledge attribution. Consider a paradigmatic case of knowledge attribution (Figure 1A). You 
are facing a cat on a chair, and opposite to you stands another agent S, whose line of sight is 
focused on the cat. The other agent’s direction of gaze naturally adds salience to the fact that the 
cat is on the chair. Because the cat is in your visual field, your grasp of this situation—call it 
your primary representation—includes the fact that the cat is on the chair (we label this element 
of your primary representation as W1). Making a spontaneous and unconscious inference from 
S’s visible line-of-sight cues, you attribute to S the mental state of knowing that the cat is on the 
chair (S knows that W1). The propositional structure of W1 makes it available for inferences about 
the world, including mental state inferences. Because factive mental states like knowing can only 
link agents with features of reality, your representations of knowing are simply structured to 
connect agents to elements included in your primary representation of reality. The simplicity of 
this type of attribution carries over to cases of ignorance: if another agent’s view of the chair is 
blocked, you can represent this agent R simply as failing to know W1, without specifying any 
independent decoupled content Wn to which R might be committed. You do not need to represent 
where R might believe the cat is now located in order to see R as not knowing that the cat is in 
the chair. 
It is at least a theoretical option for you to represent the original situation using a 
decoupled representation instead, following Tomasello’s advice of keeping the attributed mental 
content quarantined from the attributor’s primary representation. Instead of seeing S as knowing 
that the cat is on the chair, you might instead see her as having a belief that the cat is on the 
chair, where this belief happens to agree with your own belief about the matter (Figure 1B). You 
could use the observed agent’s line of sight as a cue to what she has in mind, imagining how the 
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world looks from her perspective, tokening a decoupled representation (W2) with the same 
content as your primary representation (W1).  Note that this type of attribution obliges you to 
represent “the cat is on the chair” twice (see Figure A), and to keep track of the truth of the 
agent’s state of mind by matching it to the corresponding element in your primary representation. 
While this duplication of contents might seem redundant and inefficient, a defender of 
decoupling might argue that it would not place any demands on working memory or inhibitory 
control: there need be no additional processing cost to generating an additional, decoupled 
representation W2 as long as its content does not clash with your primary representation of the 
world. Decoupling, according to this objection, only becomes effortful in contexts like the false-
belief task, where a mindreader must simultaneously maintain two conflicting representations.  
However, there is evidence that decoupled true belief attribution is also cognitively 
demanding. Consider a situation in which a state of knowledge lapses into ignorance (for 
example, when an object originally witnessed by a mindreader and target agent as going into the 
green box is removed from that location when the agent’s back is turned). If the object is then 
randomly returned to the green box before the agent returns, we have a situation in which there is 
no clash between the mindreader’s primary representation of reality (the object is in the green 
box) and the content of the decoupled representation properly attributed to the agent (the agent 
thinks the object is in the green box). In true belief cases like this, known as “Gettier cases” in 
the philosophical literature (Gettier 1963), the observed agent’s mental state is only 
coincidentally aligned with reality; it no longer constitutes knowledge because it is not formed in 
a way which can only bind an agent to a truth. Five-year-old children and nonhuman primates 
seem to treat such cases only as cases of ignorance, failing to make the more specific prediction 
that the agent will nevertheless perform an accurate reach (Fabricius et al., 2010; Horschler et al., 
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2019). Here there is no clash between the mindreader’s primary representation of reality and the 
decoupled content, but the mental state inference is still difficult, suggesting that decoupling 
itself bears a cost.   
In general, the utility of decoupling is most obvious in situations where the mindreader 
must be epistemically vigilant, because the connection between the other agent’s mind and the 
world has been disrupted in some way, and the two are at risk of diverging. As standard false-
belief task scenarios illustrate, decoupling makes sense when there is a relevant possibility that 
the content of the mental state being attributed is epistemically suspect; in these cases, 
decoupling prevents the inconsistent or false beliefs of others from contaminating your primary 
deliberative processes (Fizke et al., 2014; Schuwerk et al., 2014). In more ordinary cases of 
knowledge tracking like the one we have described, however, there has been no disruption to the 
epistemic relation between S and the world. To the mindreader, S’s knowledge of the fact that 
the cat is on the chair is as obvious and well-founded as the fact itself.2 In this context, there is no 
cause for epistemic vigilance, and no obvious reason to engage in decoupling. It would of course 
be possible for our mindreader to generate a decoupled representation of this same situation 
framed in terms of true beliefs, but it would serve no practical use unless S were motivated by an 
overabundance of epistemic caution. Otherwise, decoupling is completely otiose. In short: in 
cases where decoupled true-belief attributions serve a functional purpose, they are likely to be 
executively demanding. In cases where they are unlikely to be executively demanding, 
decoupled true-belief attributions appear to serve no functional purpose.  
 
2 We discuss how these intuitive knowledge inferences are made and tracked in sections 4 and 6. 
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One distinctive feature of this model is that the coupled contents attributed in this kind of 
factive mindreading need to be propositional in format to guide propositionally structured acts of 
telling and asking, directed at particular agents. In this regard, what is attributed in the factive 
mindreading model that we are proposing is much richer than what is attributed in various 
“minimal” models of mentalizing – for example, when applying Butterfill and Apperly’s 
registration construct, or Burge’s sensing, which are represented as simple polyadic relations 
between agents and objects in their environments, and which do not permit for any sort of 
relations between agents and propositions (Burge, 2018; Butterfill & Apperly, 2013). In contrast, 
the structure and content of the factive mental state attributions we describe here mirror the 
structure and content of our primary representations, because they both make use of the same 
representational tokens (i.e. W1). And insofar as our primary representations are propositionally 
structured, the mental states attributed through factive mindreading will be as well (c.f. 
Carruthers, 2016, p. 154).3  
This way of representing mental states has some clear limitations. On its own, factive 
mindreading does not capture the fact that a person’s knowledge of the world might be 
represented in a particular way that might differ from our own – what some refer to as “Level 2 
perspective-taking” or the “aspectuality” of propositional attitudes (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013; 
Flavell, 1977). It also does not distinguish between various ways of failing to know, between 
ignorance that consists in simply lacking a belief on a certain point, having a false belief, or 
having a true belief that fails to rise to the level of knowledge (Gettier, 1963; Plato, 1980). These 
 
3 Despite the fact that it involves propositional attitude attribution, factive mentalizing is not, strictly speaking, a 
form of meta-representation, as the latter is generally thought to involve decoupling (Perner, 1991). However, 
factive mental state attributions could be correctly described as meta-cognitive, in that they do involve a kind of 
higher-order cognition. 
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limitations are tied to the fact that the contents of factive mental state attributions are coupled 
with the contents of our primary representations of the world; representing possible or actual 
divergences from the contents or modes of presentation of one’s primary representations requires 
decoupling. But this absence of decoupling is also precisely how factive mindreading would gain 
its efficiency, since it would not require us to maintain, inhibit, or shift between multiple sets of 
mental representations, as in the case of nonfactive mindreading. All that it would require would 
be that mindreaders keep track of the presence or absence of factive mental relations.  
4. Mechanisms for efficient knowledge attribution  
Fortunately, the presence or absence of knowledge can be reliably inferred through the use of a 
number of cognitively efficient heuristics, which can be deployed in a fast and fluid manner over 
the course of a conversation. For example, one of the most reliable strategies for tracking factive 
mental states is via the monitoring of other agents’ gaze. What an agent can or cannot see can be 
tracked without representational decoupling through the use of heuristics like tracing an agent’s 
line-of-sight, imaginatively superimposed onto one’s own egocentric representation of the world 
(Michelon & Zacks, 2006). When the line-of-sight between an agent and an object or event is 
unobstructed, one can safely infer that the agent has some knowledge of that object or event; 
when line-of-sight is obstructed, no factive relative obtains.  
Sensitivity to gaze is widespread in the animal kingdom, and for good reason: monitoring 
line-of-sight can be adaptively relevant in many social contexts, from strategic competition 
among conspecifics to avoiding predators and stalking prey (Shepherd, 2010). Human beings, 
however, are morphologically unique in that our distinctive white sclera and elongated eyes 
make the direction of our gaze especially easy to follow – a trait that some researchers have 
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suggested evolved as an adaptation for visually based communication (Kobayashi & Kohshima, 
2001; Tomasello et al., 2007). Along these lines, a substantial body of research indicates that 
sensitivity to gaze direction is an important part of language comprehension and development. 
For example, tracking speakers’ gaze direction facilitates the interpretation of referential 
expressions (Jachmann et al., 2019; Sekicki & Staudte, 2018). Competence in gaze tracking in 
the first year of life has also shown to be predictive of later language development (Brooks & 
Meltzoff, 2008; Tenenbaum et al., 2015), while children at risk for autism spectrum disorder 
display abnormal patterns of gaze-following (Thorup et al., 2016). We thus have good reason to 
believe that line-of-sight is steadily monitored in face-to-face conversation, and that this supports 
successful communication. According to the factive mindreading model that we are proposing, 
line-of-sight is tracked in conversation because it is a reliable way of discerning what another 
agent does or does not know, which can in turn inform the way we pursue the epistemic goals of 
conversation. 
On its own, using line-of-sight to infer factive states only helps us to infer what an agent 
knows about their immediate surroundings. This might be useful if we are actually talking about 
entities, events, or states of affairs in the shared environment (e.g. “Look how cute the cat is!”). 
But if our topic of conversation concerns something outside our immediate environment – say a 
past event, or an abstract proposition – then the factive states inferred via gaze-tracking will be 
of little use. If factive mindreading is to support the kinds of epistemic inferences we make in 
everyday conversation, however, then it must have some efficient mechanism for representing 
factive relations between agents and absent entities and events. 
One strong candidate for such a mechanism emerges from the memory-based processing 
model of common ground reasoning (Gorman et al., 2013; Horton & Gerrig, 2005). On this 
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model, the assessment of whether or not a piece of information is mutually known and available 
for conversational purposes normally takes place implicitly, and is supported by ordinary, 
domain-general memory processes. When we share experiences with a particular person, the 
information contained in those experiences is stored as episodic memory traces, which become 
associated with that individual. When we re-encounter that person on a subsequent occasion, 
their presence will serve as a contextual memory cue. This memory cue causes the information 
previously associated with that person to become increasingly accessible for language production 
and comprehension. For example, if in the past you and a particular conversational partner once 
encountered or discussed the game of cricket, then in subsequent encounters with that partner, 
their presence will cause stored information about cricket to become highly accessible for 
conversational purposes. The fluency with which you recall cricket-information in this particular 
interpersonal context thus serves as an implicit cue that it is mutually known (Horton, 2007).  
Even when certain pieces of information have not been encountered with a person before, 
the same memory processes can still lead us to treat that information as available for 
conversational purposes when it is associated with some feature of that person’s social identity. 
The fact that a stranger is a fellow local, for example, might lead us to fluently refer to pieces of 
information that are highly accessible when speaking with other locals – for example, particular 
neighborhoods or transit lines (Isaacs & Clark, 1987). 
Meanwhile, when certain pieces of information are not strongly associated with a 
particular individual, then that information will not be antecedently accessible for the purposes of 
conversation. References to this information will feel more uncertain, reflecting more disfluent 
processing. This serves as an implicit cue that the information in question is privileged, leading 
speakers to provide additional contextual information to ensure that their referential intention is 
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clear – for example, by using a definite description instead of or alongside a name instead of 
using a name by itself (Gorman et al., 2013).  
Note that while this process relies upon low-level, domain-general mechanisms, it 
nevertheless supports our capacity for tracking mental states and flexibly judging what 
interlocutors do or do not know. In this respect, the model we are proposing is very different 
from anti-mentalistic proposals where representations of what one’s conversational partner 
knows plays a much more limited role in comprehension and production (Pickering & Garrod, 
2004; Shintel & Keysar, 2009). Cues of fluency, on our account, are not directly mapped onto 
particular kinds of behavioral responses. Rather, these low-level cues are used to generate 
intervening representations of factive mental relations: their propositional content is called into 
play to flexibly inform a variety of different comprehension and production processes (Gorman 
et al., 2013; Hanna et al., 2003).4 What a speaker does with a factive mental state attribution will 
ultimately depend upon its conversational relevance (Roberts, 2012; Wilson & Sperber, 2003).  
The memory-based processing model provides a plausible mechanism for explaining how 
factive relations to absent entities, individuals, and past events can be inferred in a fast and 
efficient manner over the course of a conversation. Just as cues like line-of-sight allow us to 
rapidly infer what a person knows about their immediate environment, feelings of fluency and 
disfluency when recalling particular pieces of information in a conversational context provide us 
with simple cues as to whether or not that information is mutually known. Unlike line-of-sight 
heuristics, however, memory-based heuristics like these are a somewhat weaker means of 
 
4 Here, our proposal is indebted to the notion of “one-bit” common ground representations invoked by Galati and 
Brennan in their account of audience design (Galati & Brennan, 2010). However, our account differs from theirs in 
that the factive representations in our account are not to be construed in meta-representational terms (c.f. Horton & 
Brennan, 2016). 
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ascertaining what another person knows. Simple associative links between an individual and an 
event might be a moderately reliable indicator that that person was present for that event, or has 
some significant relation to the topic, but occasionally this heuristic will fail. For example, 
Horton and Gerrig (2005) suggest that when we strongly associate several individuals with one 
another, the presence of one individual can serve as a retrieval cue for information that originally 
co-occurred with another. This can then lead one to mistakenly infer that information known to 
the first individual will also be known to the second – effectively, an error in source monitoring. 
Importantly, the information retrieved through these processes need not have been 
antecedently stored as knowledge attributions that were made in the past. Some accounts of 
common ground and knowledge attribution posit that for each individual we encounter, we 
maintain an “experiential registry” or “reference diary” what a person knows, which we can then 
consult in the context of conversation (Clark & Marshall, 1981; Perner & Roessler, 2012). While 
it is certainly possible that we sometimes store explicit representations of who knows what (for 
example, when monitoring whether or not a person is privy to a secret), such representations are 
often unnecessary. Instead, treating conversational partners as contextual memory cues allow us 
to compute their epistemic states on demand. The only stored representations that are required 
for this to take place are the ones that support ordinary forms of context-sensitive memory 
retrieval.  
In sum, heuristics like gaze-following and memory-based fluency cues show how states of 
knowledge can be rapidly and efficiently inferred over the course of a conversational interaction. 
This is by no means an exhaustive list of all the ways that such inferences might occur, but rather 
a set of illustrative examples that capture the kinds of processes that we suggest undergird factive 
mindreading in conversation. We also do not deny that knowledge attributions can be based on 
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explicit, strategic forms of reasoning: as we discuss in section 7, there are a variety of contexts in 
which our conversational goals might require us to engage in more effortful forms of 
mindreading. Our main claim here is simply that this kind of reasoning is unlikely to underlie the 
knowledge attributions that we must regularly make over the course of a conversation. To keep 
up with the pace with the back and forth of ordinary dialog, our default forms of knowledge 
attribution must be lean and computationally efficient (Galati & Brennan, 2010; Horton & 
Brennan, 2016). 
5. Representing when others know what you don’t 
Thus far, this picture of factive mentalizing shows how we can infer when another agent knows 
about or is ignorant of something that we ourselves know. But this is only part of the story. As 
we have noted, the epistemic goal of conversation is to extend interlocutors’ shared knowledge. 
Sometimes this means informing others about facts of which they are ignorant, but other times it 
means seeking out from others knowledge that we ourselves lack. This means representing the 
fact that someone knows something that we do not, or what Jonathan Phillips and Aaron Norby 
(2019) call “egocentric ignorance”. As it stands, the account of factive mental state 
representation that we have outlined doesn’t provide us with an obvious way to do this. In this 
section, we show how our factive mindreading framework could be extended to handle these 
cases. 
Our account of tracking egocentric ignorance begins with a peculiar feature of factive 
mental state verbs: they enable us to express epistemic relations between agents and questions. In 
a positive attribution of knowledge, what is known may be specified directly, with a “that”-
clause, as in, “Alice knows that Bill was fired”, or indirectly, with an embedded question, as in 
“Alice knows whether Bill was fired”, or “Alice knows who was fired.” Attributions of 
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ignorance (or the lack of knowledge) are similarly capable of taking declarative or interrogative 
complements (“Charles does not know that Daphne is at home”; “Charles does not know where 
Daphne is”) (Hintikka, 1975). Notably, knowledge-that and knowledge-wh are not 
fundamentally different in their content: Both types of attribution are made true by someone’s 
knowledge (or in the negative case, their ignorance) of some fact. In cases of knowledge-wh, this 
fact will be the true answer to the embedded question: if the truth is that Frank bought a car, then 
to know what Frank bought is to know that Frank bought a car. From an omniscient perspective, 
all propositional knowledge could be represented as knowledge-that or knowledge-wh.  
From a non-omniscient perspective, however, knowledge-wh attributions have a valuable 
function: They permit us to represent an agent’s epistemic state even when we do not know the 
content of that state ourselves. Positive knowledge-wh attributions, for example, enable 
mindreaders to represent the perspective of an agent whose epistemic position is stronger than 
their own (“Ella knows what Frank bought, but I still don’t”); negative knowledge-wh 
attributions permit mindreaders to represent information that is privately or mutually unknown 
(“Ella does not know what Frank bought, and I don’t either”). 
In belief attribution, we are only able to directly specify the true or false proposition 
believed with a that-clause, as in “Greta thinks that Hank has quit.” Crucially, belief-attributing 
verbs do not take embedded questions as complements; we cannot formulate an indirect belief 
attribution by saying, “Greta believes whether Hank has quit”, or “Greta thinks what Hank did”. 
We can form constructions like “Greta has a belief about whether Hank has quit”, but this type of 
construction fails to capture the content of Greta’s state of mind, beyond indicating its topic.5 By 
 
5 In particular, note that if Greta believes that Hank has quit while Ingrid believes that Hank has not quit, then they 
both have beliefs as to whether he has quit, although the contents of these beliefs are diametrically opposed. If they 
both know whether he has quit, then they must agree. 
MINDREADING IN CONVERSATION 
27 
 
contrast, indirect knowledge attribution really does capture the relevant content, even if it doesn’t 
specify it overtly: If Greta knows whether Hank has quit, then there is some truth out there in the 
world about Hank, and whatever it is, this truth is what Greta has in mind, a truth she could 
express directly if asked. If Greta just has a belief about whether Hank has quit, then we can 
expect her to give some answer if questioned about the matter, but not necessarily the right 
answer. However, outside of formulaic greetings and special contexts like pretence, the point of 
inquiry or questioning is generally not just to come up with some answer or another, or to see 
what the respondent will say, but to get the right answer. This point does something to explain 
why constructions involving “knows whether” are more than 100 times more common in corpus 
data than constructions involving “belief about whether” (Davies, 2008): the simplicity and 
frequency of the former type of construction are evidence of its greater practical utility.  
This difference is a cross-linguistically robust phenomenon: Verbs in the family of 
“know” embed questions, where verbs in the family of “believe” do not (Karttunen, 1977; Lahiri, 
2002). It has been argued that this is because an interrogative complement denotes the true 
answer to the question that it embeds, so it would be out of place under a cognitive verb like 
“believe” that can take either true or false complements (Egré, 2008). It may also reflect the fact 
that the knowing and believing relations themselves have fundamentally different kinds of social 
and practical significance, which has shaped the evolution and development of our basic 
mindreading abilities, both linguistic and otherwise.6 Along these lines, there is even evidence 
that the capacity to track knowledge-wh does not require language at all: At least some 
nonhuman primates are able to attribute knowledge-wh, selectively following the behavior of a 
 
6 For a recent proposal about the influence of core knowledge structures on the emergence of linguistic universals, 
see Strickland (2017).  
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better-positioned agent who knows where a reward is located (Krachun et al., 2009).7 This is 
consistent with the idea that tracking knowledge-wh is a very basic – and perhaps very ancient – 
form of mindreading: Agents with this capacity can selectively rely on each other as guides to 
parts of the world they have not yet explored for themselves. 
For some proponents of the factive mindreading framework, how exactly we represent 
egocentric ignorance has posed something of a puzzle. Phillips and Norby (2019) argue that 
doing so must be more cognitively demanding than the complementary task of attributing 
ignorance to another on a question on which one is knowledgeable (they call this altercentric 
ignorance). To represent egocentric ignorance, these authors suggest, one must in effect 
represent the set of possible knowledge states that the knowledgeable agent might have (a “map 
of maps,” in their terminology). If correct, then representing egocentric ignorance would not just 
be more complex than representing altercentric ignorance, but also more complex than 
representing beliefs: instead of generating a single decoupled representation – as is the case in 
belief attribution – this way of representing egocentric ignorance would force us to generate 
multiple decoupled representations at once, each corresponding to a possible knowledge state.  
However, this approach is implausibly demanding in conversational contexts. 
Understanding that others possess information that one lacks is a likely precondition for being 
able to learn through explicit verbal questioning – that is, requesting information from 
knowledgeable others. Phillips and Norby’s account seems to imply that this very basic form of 
social learning requires a great deal of cognitive sophistication. But this does not comport with 
the data on the development of interrogative behavior: by age two, well-formed verbal questions 
 
7 There is also some evidence that nonhuman primates may be able to track beliefs (Krupenye et al., 2016), but there 
are doubts about whether this indicates even an implicit representation of false belief, as opposed to some weaker 
registration of what the agent has recently seen (Tomasello, 2018). 
MINDREADING IN CONVERSATION 
29 
 
constitute a large proportion of children’s speech when interacting with caregivers (Chouinard, 
2007), and by roughly 30 months of age, although children can also ask for objects, help, and 
permission, they are predominantly asking for information (P. L. Harris et al., 2017). During the 
second year of life, infants also engage in a wide range of selective social learning behaviors, 
which also suggests a degree of proficiency when monitoring who knows more than they do 
(Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016). It would be quite odd if children at this age – whose 
basic decoupling abilities are the source of some controversy (Perner, 1991) – are nevertheless 
able to sustain the kinds of representational activities that Phillips and Norby describe. Rather, it 
seems that from an early age, children are capable of representing not only the ignorance of 
others, but also their own ignorance relative to the knowledge of another. 
The problem with Phillips and Norby’s account, we suggest, is that it implicitly assumes 
that when we attribute knowledge-wh to someone else, we must represent the set of possible 
answers to the embedded question as well. But this is not the right way to construe the 
representational demands of questions. While there is a sense in which a question semantically 
denotes the set of propositions constituting its possible answers, where the form of a question 
constrains what falls into this set (Hamblin, 1976; Roberts, 2012), an agent asking or thinking of 
a question themselves need not represent these answers as such. Rather, there is good reason to 
think that questions can function as basic, non-meta-representational representations of the world 
(Carruthers, 2018). The cognitive content of these “questioning attitudes” is the question itself 
(e.g. “What’s over there?” or “Who’s that?”), not its possible answers. Of course, it is possible to 
also represent the possible answers to a questioning attitude over the course of deliberation. But 
as Carruthers argues, the basic function of these attitudes is not deliberation as such, but rather 
the guidance of information-seeking behaviors.  
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This representational characteristic of questioning attitudes also applies when we 
represent basic factive relations between agents and questions. Imagine, for instance, that you are 
seated across the room from another agent, separated by an opaque barrier. A third agent enters 
and appears to place something behind the barrier, out of your line of sight but within that of the 
second agent. Curious about the object, you might token a primary representation of the 
following form: “What is behind the barrier?” This attitude reflects the fact that there is a gap in 
your knowledge, a patch of the world that has currently become inaccessible to you. Monitoring 
the second agent’s line of sight, you might also think, “S knows what is behind the barrier.” But 
attributing knowledge of this question’s answer to the second agent does not require you to 
represent all of its possible answers any more than thinking the question in the first place. Rather, 
all you need to do is keep track of the fact that “What is behind the barrier” is known to the other 
agent, even if it is not known to you.  
As this case illustrates, inferences about basic factive relations between agents and 
questions could be generated on the basis of the same heuristics described in the previous 
section. This is most obvious in cases of perceptual knowledge of one’s immediate environment, 
in which line-of-sight cues can tell us whether another agent has visual access to a patch of the 
world that is currently inaccessible to us. Memory-based processes could likewise account for 
the attribution of knowledge about absent entities, past events, or abstract topics. Suppose one 
strongly associates a particular conversational partner with a specific topic – say, the local 
basketball team. When you encounter this person, the fluency with which that topic comes to 
mind will serve as a strong cue that they have knowledge of it. When one has a particular 
question in mind about that topic (e.g. “Who is leading in the Eastern Conference?”), the 
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presence of this epistemic cue can lead us to quickly judge that this person is likely to have the 
answer.  
In sum, once we have taken into account the fact that questioning attitudes can be a part 
of our primary representations of the world, tracking when others know what we do not becomes 
a simple matter of inferring basic factive relations between agents and those questions. Like 
other forms of basic factive mindreading, this need not involve any kind of meta-representation, 
nor the storage of special-purpose reference diaries documenting all the things we take a person 
to know.  
6. Epistemic tracking in conversation 
6.1. Epistemic territory 
The strategies for monitoring each other’s factive mental states described in our model are 
consistent with a notion proposed by researchers in the field of conversation analysis: our 
conversational turns are often guided by routine assignments of “epistemic territory”, or topic 
areas in which we attribute knowledge by default, following common patterns. For example, in 
virtually all settings, people are assumed to know more than others about their own feelings, 
thoughts and recent experiences; individuals are also generally credited with greater knowledge 
on such close-to-home topics as their own “relatives, friends, pets, jobs, and hobbies” (Heritage, 
2012a). These default assignments enable conversation to move forward even between 
previously unacquainted individuals: for a substantial range of topics, one will have clear 
expectations about whether the other party will be more or less knowledgeable than oneself.  
Initial default mappings of epistemic territory are important, according to Heritage, 
because as soon as conversation gets past greetings into clausal content, these mappings, which 
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run on a scale between K+ (clearly possessing knowledge) and K- (clearly lacking knowledge), 
are needed to solve not only the speaker’s problem of whether to ask or tell, but also the 
addressee’s problem of whether they are being told or asked. One might imagine that an 
addressee solves this last problem just by noticing whether the speaker has used declarative or 
interrogative syntax; however, the social actions of asking and telling are mutually recognized by 
the parties involved not simply by grammatical distinctions on their own, but in a way that is 
subject to prior assignments of epistemic status. Drawing on an extensive body of empirical 
work (Labov & Fanshel, 1977; Pomerantz, 1980; Stivers, 2010), Heritage argues that even a 
sentence with declarative syntax can heard as a question if the content is obviously within the 
addressee’s epistemic territory but not the speaker’s. For example, when a physician is taking a 
patient’s medical history, her utterance of the declarative sentence, “You’re married” will 
register as a question, even when spoken with falling intonation, because a person’s own marital 
status lies deeply within their own epistemic territory, and typically further from the epistemic 
territory of a medical professional. By choosing that declarative formulation, the physician takes 
a mild K- stance, suggesting some familiarity with the patient, but other options are open. 
Switching to a tag question (“You’re married, aren’t you?”) would constitute more of a K- 
stance, and full interrogative syntax (“Are you married?”) would be a stronger K- stance, 
appropriate in speaking to a new patient, for example (Heritage, 2012a). Meanwhile, 
interrogative sentences can function as rhetorical rather than genuine questions, eliciting 
conversational response patterns virtually identical to the response patterns characteristic of 
statements (Rohde, 2006). But a rhetorical question is only felicitous if the answer is already 
obvious to both speaker and addressee, so the possibility of this kind of conversational move 
again depends on prior calculation of what the parties will (take themselves to) know. 
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Instinctive mapping of epistemic territory also explains some recent experimental results 
advanced in support of the hypothesis that mentalizing is pervasive in ordinary conversation 
(Rubio-Fernández, Mollica et al., 2019). This work investigated the processing of statements 
which either did or did not violate expectations about what imagined strangers or friends would 
know. The same comment (about a hidden health condition such as an ulcer, for example) could 
be unremarkable if an overheard stranger is commenting on his own hidden health condition, or 
odd if a stranger is commenting on your hidden health condition; we do not expect strangers to 
have access to this part of our epistemic territory. By contrast, if a friend or family member 
comments on your ulcer, this is routine again. Rubio-Fernández and colleagues presented 
scenarios of each type to their participants, framed by contextualizing sentences which invited 
the participant to imagine themselves as addressees in a social setting with a friend or stranger 
(“you are having dinner with your dad at a restaurant when he says...”). They found slower 
reading times for the sentences in which strangers (as opposed to friends or family) were 
somehow aware of (presumably imagined) facts in the private life of the addressee. They 
concluded that dialogue is understood in light of “a default preference to monitor our 
interlocutor’s knowledge states.” (2019, 6).  
Rubio- Fernández and colleagues do not distinguish between factive and nonfactive 
mentalizing—indeed, in their usage “belief reasoning” is equivalent with “estimating another 
person’s knowledge” (2019, 1)—but we think the task here can be executed entirely with factive 
mindreading. The anomaly triggering the slowdown was not for example that the content of what 
was said was specifically processed as questionable or false, therefore triggering the need for 
belief reasoning: If it were, then readers (presumed not to have ulcers) should have been equally 
puzzled and slowed by the parallel remarks of the stranger and the friend or family member. The 
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problem was a violation in what the stranger could be expected to know, and in expecting the 
stranger to lack knowledge on a topic, it does not matter whether the topical remark is false or 
even coincidentally true (in the event that the stranger happens to be right). Strangers are not 
expected to know about our hidden health conditions, and even those we know quite well have 
limits to their epistemic territory: Rubio-Fernández and colleagues observe that you would find it 
alarming if your boss were to say something about a nightmare you had last night (2019, 3). We 
can make different default assignments of epistemic territory to different individuals, 
differentiated broadly by topic: even strangers are expected to know about the weather, certain 
friends and I know my health secrets, only I know about the dreams I have just had.  
6.2. Cooperatively signaling epistemic status 
Beyond our default assignments of epistemic territory, in live conversation we also face the more 
difficult task of refining and updating our models of what is known in light of what has been 
said: We ask each other questions, not always sure in advance of whether the other knows the 
answer, and we expect others to take on board at least some part of what we are sharing with 
them. Often one’s initial knowledge attributions prove to be incorrect, and must be revised. And 
even if one’s default assignments are correct, one must still constantly revise them to register the 
fact that the epistemic status of one’s partner has changed as a result of successful knowledge 
transmission. Thus, managing the epistemic goals of conversation requires the ability to 
dynamically update our representations of what our interlocutor knows as the conversation 
unfolds. 
This kind of epistemic tracking is aided by the production of overt signals of epistemic 
gain. In English, speakers produce the epistemic change-of-state marker “oh” (and, less 
frequently, “ah”) to signal knowledge gain, or the revival of stored knowledge to current 
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awareness (Aijmer, 2002; Heritage, 1984). Both “oh” and “ah” can be produced to indicate 
surprise, the most marked form of knowledge gain, but they are also produced in response to 
unremarkable types of knowledge acquisition. “Oh” commonly functions as a receipt for 
information received in a response to a question, often coupled with an assessment (“Oh, 
thanks”; “oh great”; “oh no”).  This use of “oh” marks the closing of an information-seeking 
sequence: the questioner wanted knowledge, the respondent produced it, and the questioner then 
signals that her epistemic needs are satisfied, and the exchange is complete (Heritage, 1984, 
2012b).  The production of epistemic gain signals is a cross-linguistically robust phenomenon, 
with some variation in how it is implemented: the Mandarin “ou” corresponds closely to the 
responsive English “oh”  (Wu, 2017), while other languages, such as Finnish, divide the work of 
“oh” between several particles (Koivisto, 2016), 
“Oh” is heavily used: as a marker taking the initial position in conversational turns, it is 
second only to “yeah”, which more often acknowledges information already accepted, 
sometimes signalling agreement and sometimes signalling something more like mere registration 
of the prior conversational turn (Norrick, 2009). We can clarify the way in which “oh” functions 
to signal knowledge gain by looking at contexts in which it is inappropriate: In pedagogical 
questioning, for example, where the teacher already knows the answer to the question she is 
asking, an expected answer should not elicit an “oh”, but something more like “that’s right, very 
good” (Heritage, 2018, p. 31). It is also possible to use “oh” deceptively, to pretend that one is 
just then learning what one already knew, but the availability of this trick is parasitic on 
awareness of the usual meaning of “oh” to signal knowledge gain. “Oh” can also be produced 
when one is in receipt of information that only seems to be knowledge (perhaps someone has 
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answered your question incorrectly), but it is like any other word in this regard (“gold” can also 
be produced in response to something mistaken for gold).  
Importantly, while signals like “oh” are well-suited to signal changes in epistemic status, 
it is less clear how they might function to signal changes in belief. This is because vocalizations 
like “oh” are unstructured, which means that they have a relatively low informational bandwidth. 
For the purposes of efficiently communicating information that can be processed by one’s 
partner while they are speaking, this low bandwidth is a feature rather than a bug. And 
unstructured signals work relatively well when one simply aims to indicate a positive or negative 
change in one’s epistemic status, which can be reduced to a simple, one-dimensional parameter – 
namely, an increase or decrease in knowledge. Meanwhile, it is harder to imagine how one might 
convey changes of belief using unstructured signals. In order to convey useful information about 
a change in belief (e.g. shifting from “I believe it will rain” to “I believe it will snow”), one must 
be able to express something about their contents. But since the contents of a belief can vary in 
indefinitely many ways, that information is not so easily conveyed in a low bandwidth signaling 
system. Thus, information about changes in epistemic status is compressible in way that 
information about changes in belief is not, making it possible for us to efficiently signal changes 
in epistemic status in interactive contexts. 
Factive mindreading is supported not only by direct signals like “oh”, but also by a 
variety of other verbal and non-verbal indications of understanding. In recent work on simple 
“get acquainted” conversations, between participants with little initial common ground, Janet 
Bavelas and colleagues have studied a wide variety of devices used to signal knowledge transfer. 
They argue that new information is accepted into the common ground in face-to-face dialogue 
through a three-step procedure of speaker introduction, addressee response and speaker follow-
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up. Here, the addressee response may consist in a verbal signal such as “oh”, or other expressive 
gestures (eyes widening, nodding); the speaker then demonstrates acceptance of that response 
with an utterance or gesture that does not introduce new topical content (“yeah”, nodding, 
smiling). In a study of over 1200 utterances introducing new information, they found that this 
three-step calibration process was followed 97% of the time (Bavelas et al., 2017). These overt 
signalling processes provide feedback to participants in cooperative conversations on how they 
are progressing towards their goal of shared knowledge. 
Without the production of overt signals for knowledge gain, each side of a conversation 
could still begin with some intuitive mapping of the other side’s epistemic position, and update 
that mapping privately on the hope or expectation that the other side heard and accepted what 
was said. The production of a knowledge receipt signal (“oh, great”) makes it easier for both 
sides to engage in factive mindreading as conversation proceeds: the signal is confirmation that 
the recipient not only heard but accepts what was said, and indeed gained knowledge from it. 
The burden of representing the epistemic positions of the parties in the conversation is shared 
between the conversational participants, with each instinctively volunteering indications of 
progress towards salient shared knowledge, at least in cooperative conversations. 
This leads us to a final observation about the conversational role of factive mindreading: it is 
interactive. A common critique of standard, belief-based approaches to mindreading in recent 
years has been that it is construed as a solitary, observational activity, and that much of the time, 
our socio-cognitive abilities are deployed in dynamic, interactive social contexts (De Jaegher et 
al., 2010). While we have some reservations about this “interactionist” approach to social 
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cognition,8 we think that it captures an important feature of the kind of mental state attribution 
we are describing. Listeners, in this model, are not passive interpreters of speakers’ utterances. 
By constantly signaling changes in their epistemic states, listeners actively assist speakers in the 
task of inferring their respective epistemic territories. Their feedback helps to shape the 
information that the speaker shares, so that it is appropriately calibrated to the listener’s 
epistemic status. The listener thus actively participates in making their mind more readable, 
thereby facilitating the achievement of shared knowledge. This interactive mindreading strategy 
might also be achievable through a belief-tracking approach, but this would likely require a great 
deal of cognitive effort. Factive mindreading enables us to achieve the joint goals of cooperative 
conversation in a fluid, seamless, efficient manner. 
7. When decoupling is needed 
Having laid out our basic account of factive mindreading in conversation, we now turn to its 
relationship with nonfactive mindreading, and the roles that the latter plays in conversation. In 
cognitive terms, the distinction we have been drawing between factive and nonfactive 
mindreading can be thought of in terms of iterative reprocessing theories of dual-process 
cognition (Cunningham et al., 2007; Van Overwalle & Vandekerckhove, 2013). In these models, 
intuitive processes provide a quick default way of representing a stimulus or problem, which can 
either be accepted or modified through the use of slower, more representationally flexible, 
working memory-based computations. The extent to which the latter kinds of computation are 
involved in the reprocessing and reconstrual of a stimulus depends upon both the motivations of 
the agent and the availability of additional cognitive resources. If an intervention occurs, the 
 
8 Indeed, one of us has argued that concept of interaction often gets misused in these debates (Schönherr & Westra, 
2018) 
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stimulus is reprocessed, this time while retrieving additional information and employing more 
complex representational formats. Depending on the agent’s motivations, reprocessing can be 
repeated iteratively, generating increasingly nuanced representations of the stimulus with each 
cycle.  
We suggest this is also the way to think about the relationship between factive and 
nonfactive forms of mentalizing, and in particular the shift towards a heavier reliance on 
decoupling. In the context of a straightforward cooperative conversation where the shared goal is 
to extend the speakers’ mutual knowledge, coupled, factive mental state representations serve as 
a default means of mapping out and updating their respective epistemic territories. Nonfactive 
mindreading resources are recruited as needed when higher level monitoring systems detect that 
the default construal requires modification.9 In these cases, more elaborate, fully decoupled 
models of the target’s mind are constructed. This enables the mindreader to represent further 
properties of the agent’s mental states, including their particular mode of presentation and their 
divergence from reality. Using these representations for the purpose of prediction and 
interpretation will require agents to inhibit their own perspective, which places a burden on their 
executive resources.10  
Below, we outline a few of the contexts where the shift towards is likely to occur: deliberate 
deception, meta-linguistic repair, and argumentation. This list is intended to be illustrative rather 
than exhaustive: there are doubtless many other conversational contexts that require nonfactive, 
decoupled mindreading – for example, pretense, the comprehension of irony, and other cases of 
 
9 Note that on this model, not all forms of nonfactive mindreading are alike: Depending upon the number of 
reprocessing cycles involved in a bout of mindreading, our construal of a person’s beliefs might be fairly sparse and 
schematic, or it might be quite rich and detailed.  
10 Although we leave open the possibility that with experience, agents might develop some expertise with this kind 
of reasoning in particular contexts, allowing them to become faster and more efficient at it over time (Elekes et al., 
2016; Westra, 2017b). 
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semantic or pragmatic ambiguity. Indeed, a variety of communicative goals may regularly 
require us to depart from our factive mindreading default and engage in bouts of decoupling. 
There are also some domains, such as judgments of taste, whose status as factual is controversial, 
understood by some as expressing truths only relative to an assessor (Lasersohn, 2005), and by 
others as reflecting a combination of facts about the current state of discourse and facts about the 
world (Barker, 2013).11 For the sake of brevity, we focus only on the three simpler cases 
mentioned above. 
7.1.Deliberate Deception  
In ordinary communicative contexts, conversational partners have the joint goal of achieving 
shared knowledge; our factive mindreading framework is in part an experience of how we pursue 
this end. But in contexts of deception or manipulation, conversation is no longer fully 
cooperative, and conversational partners are not pursuing a shared epistemic goal.12 In these 
cases, factive mindreading is no longer sufficient (c.f. Pickering & Garrod, 2004, p. 180). 
Deceivers instead aim to unilaterally reduce the epistemic status of their interlocutors by causing 
them to form false beliefs. To do this effectively, deceivers need to maintain a representation of 
how the listener is thinking about the world that diverges from their own, and inhibit their own 
first-personal representations from interfering with their utterances. This is reflected in 
developmental research on lying, which shows that children’s ability to lie effectively emerges in 
 
11 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing us on the question of what should count as factual, including 
predicates of taste, modal statements and statements about the future. Insofar as the latter types of statement can 
already enter into one’s primary representation of the world independently of interaction with another agent, they 
should count as factual for our purposes here.  It is a good question whether judgments of taste call for decoupled 
mindreading; arguably, decoupling would be necessary only when standards are contested, but this is a question for 
future research. 
12 Not all acts of deception are entirely uncooperative, of course. In the course of otherwise cooperative 
conversations, we often engage in white lies and other limited acts of deception, which also require decoupling. 
Because lies of this sort are in fact quite common in our everyday lives (DePaulo et al., 1998), it stands to reason 
that decoupling is likely to be a fairly routine occurrence.  
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tandem with their belief-reasoning skills and is closely linked to levels of inhibitory control 
(Talwar & Lee, 2008; Williams et al., 2016); similar capacities are also implicated in adult 
deception (Christ et al., 2009). Deceiving others thus forces us to generate explicit 
representations of the minds of others, while also expending greater cognitive resources. 
Something similar may be true in contexts where listeners are attuned to the possibility that a 
speaker intends to deceive, a disposition sometimes referred to as “epistemic vigilance” (Sperber 
et al., 2010). In such cases, we recognize that a speaker’s goal is not to pursue shared knowledge, 
but instead to induce the listener to act on the basis of a misrepresentation of the world. Like the 
capacity to deceive, this ability emerges around age four (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009), around the 
time that children pass the false-belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Notably, children around 
this age are also slightly better at passing the false belief task when the target’s false belief is the 
result of a deliberate deception (Chandler et al., 1989; Hala et al., 1991). Adults are also more 
likely to refer to an agent’s beliefs when describing a silent video when it depicts a false-belief-
inducing act of deception (Papafragou et al., 2007). Recognizing that an actor has deceptive 
intent thus creates a pragmatic context in which belief representation suddenly becomes relevant 
(Westra, 2017a), prompting a shift from factive to nonfactive forms of mindreading.  
7.2. Meta-linguistic repair 
Normally, the combination of a shared language, shared environment, and shared socio-cultural 
experiences will be enough for speakers to successfully communicate new information using 
only factive mindreading strategies. But occasionally, differences in the way speakers construe 
the world and differences in the way speakers use language can lead to communication 
difficulties. One clear example of this occurs after failures in “message formation” (Horton & 
Gerrig, 2005), when speakers use referring expressions that fail to determine the identity of the 
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referent. While selecting and interpreting referring expressions might normally operate according 
to simple associative principles (Horton & Gerrig, 2005; Shintel & Keysar, 2009), occasional 
breakdowns lead us to engage in decoupled forms of mindreading that allow us to better 
represent the way a speaker is thinking about the world. For example, when a speaker says, “I 
spoke to John this week,” and the listener associates two different individuals with the name 
“John,” they might initially misinterpret which person the speaker is referring to (Pickering & 
Garrod, 2004, p. 180). Such misalignments between speakers lead to confusion, perhaps 
accompanied by a verbal or nonverbal signal of lowered epistemic status (e.g. “huh?”). 
Resolving this kind of confusion requires interlocutors to explicitly consider the contrast between 
their different beliefs about the referent of “John,” which requires decoupled mindreading.13 This 
kind of miscommunication is also likely to prompt speakers to engage in explicit meta-linguistic 
negotiations (e.g. “Wait, by ‘John,’ do you mean John Smith?”) until realignment is achieved. 
A parallel form of collaborative meta-linguistic reasoning is conversation is evident in 
reference communication tasks (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Ibarra & Tanenhaus, 2016; Schober & 
Clark, 1989). In these studies, one participant plays the role of the director, while the other plays 
the role of a matcher. Separated by an opaque screen, the director must help the matcher select 
one particular image from a set of abstract, geometric shapes (or tangrams). To do this, the 
director must find a way of referring to the figure in question that the matcher will understand. 
Usually, the director offers multiple different possible descriptions of the referent, and the 
matcher counters with their own descriptions, until they have successfully aligned upon the same 
referent. In this process, the two partners might cycle through a number of different ways of 
 
13 Repair following communication breakdowns need not always require decoupled mindreading. Often the source 
of a communication breakdown is a misjudgment about what a hearer knows. This can be resolved by adjusting 
one’s model of the speaker and listener’s respective epistemic territories. 
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construing the same entity, describing it as “a candle”, “an anchor,” or “a dancer”, until their 
conversational goal is achieved (Horton & Brennan, 2016). In such tasks, unusual, contrived 
features of the experimental design – like having to refer to completely novel objects without a 
shared visual environment – prevent speakers from relying upon ordinary coupled mindreading 
strategies, forcing them to explicitly consider different possible modes of presentation of the 
same referent. Under these conditions, speakers must rely upon decoupled mindreading 
strategies in order to achieve conversational alignment. 
The link between decoupled mindreading and repairing linguistic misalignment is 
supported by another body of evidence: The development of children’s meta-linguistic 
understanding. Specifically, between three and five years of age, children’s performance on tasks 
measuring their grasp of synonymy and homonymy is very highly correlated with their 
performance on traditional false-belief tasks, even after controlling for verbal mental age 
(Doherty, 2000; Perner et al., 2002). On our approach, this makes a lot of sense: Understanding 
synonymy and homonymy and learning to pass false-belief tasks both require us to actively 
consider different ways that an agent can represent the world. The similar representational 
demands of false-belief reasoning and meta-linguistic reasoning also seems to underlie bilingual 
children’s advantage on false-belief tasks (Diaz & Farrar, 2018; Schroeder, 2018), since these 
children are constantly confronted with people thinking about and referring to the same parts of 
the world in different ways.14  
In short, failures of alignment at the level of referring expressions and resultant bouts of 
meta-linguistic reasoning can force speakers and listeners into a decoupled, executively 
 
14 This activity might also be what promotes the development of bilingual children’s cognitive flexibility and 
inhibitory control (Bialystok & Viswanathan, 2009), executive abilities that are also implicated in nonfactive 
mindreading (Farrant et al., 2012; Sabbagh et al., 2006). 
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demanding mode of mindreading. Resolving these failures requires them to generate decoupled 
representations of how their conversational partner is thinking about the world, and why they are 
describing the world in a particular way.15 
7.3.Argumentation 
In contrast to simpler practices of unchallenged telling, argumentative conversations involve the 
public production of explicit reasons for accepting or rejecting a claim. It is possible to engage in 
an argumentative conversation with like-minded individuals, sharing various supporting reasons 
for an already-accepted claim, but the work of producing explicit arguments would most 
naturally be motivated in contexts where a speaker stands to gain by persuading a disagreeing 
party; indeed, this application has been seen as the evolutionary basis of the universal human 
capacity to reason. As evidence that argumentation has the natural function of resolving 
disagreement, arguments among disagreeing parties are higher in quality, in the sense of showing 
more rigor in the evaluation of reasons, and generally producing more accurate outcomes 
(Mercier & Sperber, 2017).  
Factive mindreading plays a large part in the successful construction of persuasive 
arguments. For example, when challenged to justify their decisions or persuade an ignorant 
party, even preschoolers are sensitive to what their questioners will and will not know (Köymen 
et al., 2016; Mascaro et al., 2019). Factive mindreading on its own may be sufficient for some 
simple arguments, and for sharing reasons with others who are like-minded. However, when 
arguments emerge in their natural role of resolving disagreement, nonfactive mindreading will 
 
15 As noted by two anonymous reviewers, what explains the role of mindreading in these meta-linguistic cases is not 
nonfactivity as such, but rather the process of decoupling, which is what enables us to reason about modes of 
representation (i.e. the “aspectuality” of mental states (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013)). Decoupling also happens to be 
what explains how we attribute false beliefs and other nonfactive states, and so mindreading in nonfactive and 
metalinguistic cases reflects the same underlying process. 
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swiftly become vital to successive argumentation. Recognizing that another person disagrees 
with you on some question (say, whether p) is a matter of belief attribution, not simply a matter 
of seeing them as failing to know whether p. Someone might fail to know whether p by having 
no opinion at all on that question, by having the false belief that not-p, or the true belief that p, 
but held for the wrong reasons. To judge one’s adversary as disagreeing, one needs to see them 
as having a view on p opposite to one’s own, so in ordinary cases of sincere argument, they will 
appear to their argumentative adversary to have a false belief, and the goal of the argument will 
be to talk them out of it, keeping track of their adherence to that false belief as a measure of how 
well the argument is progressing towards that goal.16  
In particular, the construction of effective counter-arguments requires correctly identifying 
the content of an adversary’s belief, as opposed to simply registering this adversary as failing to 
know. Research on the development of more advanced argumentative skills in 3-8 year-olds 
shows a significant correlation between argumentative performance and theory of mind scores on 
a battery of first-and second-order false belief tasks; indeed, theory of mind is a more significant 
predictor of argumentative competence than age or verbal ability (Slaughter et al., 2013). The 
correlation between nonfactive mindreading and argument extends beyond typically developing 
children: In a recent study also including children with autism spectrum disorder and deaf 
children of hearing parents, scores on false belief tasks remain stronger predictors of 
argumentative persuasion than age, verbal ability or disability status (Peterson et al., 2018). 
Nonfactive mindreading ability is especially predictive of “hetero-oriented” persuasion 
strategies, which take account of the reasons others are giving for their refusal, while affective 
 
16 Insincere argument, in which one argues for a conclusion that one personally rejects, is a special case of deliberate 
deception, and so will additionally involve belief reasoning for the reasons already reviewed in section 7.1. 
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empathy and verbal ability were not found to correlate with this type of argumentative skill  
(Lonigro et al., 2017). 
8. Conclusion 
Having argued that factive mindreading is generally easier than non-factive mindreading, we 
should also acknowledge explicitly that there are some special cases in which it will be harder. 
On many questions, epistemic authority is easy to spot; even if I have no idea of your marital 
status, I can easily take you to know what it is. On other questions, epistemic authority can be 
hard-won, and its signs harder to detect than the signs of sincere belief. It could be clear to me 
that an enthusiastic young paleontologist believes that a fossil fragment they have just found is 
from some obscure species of dinosaur, even if I am in no position to discern whether they 
actually know this. Similarly, while instinctive attributions of ignorance concern a natural 
domain of salient truths—I instinctively see you as failing to know that there is a threat looming 
behind you, for example—reasoned attributions of ignorance can concern almost any 
proposition, true or false, and the detection of ignorance can involve not only simple sightline 
calculations, but complex evaluations of the quality of someone’s reasoning.  
The existence of these harder cases does not speak against the notion that cooperative 
conversations generally involve participants with more easily recognized forms of knowledge 
and ignorance, however. Our model predicts that conversation will be easier with cooperative 
partners whose epistemic state is evident: for example, conversational partners will be swifter to 
ask questions of or accept information from those who are conspicuously well-positioned to 
reply, especially when compared to conversational partners for whom the relevant facts appear to 
lie outside their likely epistemic territory (Rubio-Fernández et al., 2019). One way to explore 
these predictions might be to exploit the relationship between factive mentalizing and gaze 
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tracking in order to manipulate default attributions of epistemic territory – for example, by 
placing participants in tasks where they are reliant upon the advice of two speakers with different 
levels of visual access, and then measuring how readily they seek out or respond to information 
from an incongruent epistemic source. A slightly different way to manipulate default attributions 
of epistemic territory might be to take advantage of listeners’ prior assumptions about the 
differences in the background knowledge between experts and non-experts. In general, we 
should expect differences in default attributions of epistemic territory to affect both information-
seeking behavior and the speed of information uptake. 
If conversational partners learn from each other chiefly through factive mentalizing, we 
should expect to see evidence of this in the development of communicative abilities. At the age 
of 18 months, infants already show selective social learning from conversational partners, 
distinguishing between informants who had and had not accurately named familiar objects. In a 
novel word-learning task, 18-month-olds were more likely to retain new words taught by an 
informant with a track record of reliability; performance on this task was correlated with success 
on a knowledge attribution task, but not with measures of false belief attribution or domain-
general statistical learning skills (Crivello et al., 2018). Contrasting these results with evidence 
on the relations between performance on the false-belief task and abilities such as lying (Talwar 
& Lee, 2008) and epistemic vigilance (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009) yields a further prediction: 
Competence on factive and non-factive mentalizing tasks should exhibit different developmental 
relations with cooperative and non-cooperative communicative abilities.  
In many conversational tasks, it can be unclear whether factive or nonfactive mentalizing 
is called into play, and researchers may want to re-examine tasks that have been assumed to 
demonstrate facility with decoupled content. For example, the Diverse Beliefs task is typically 
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interpreted as testing whether children are able to represent beliefs opposed to their own, in a 
situation in which the truth is an open question. However, factive mentalizing would afford 
another way to pass this test. The task is conversational, in that children are told about the mental 
state of the protagonist, rather than needing to infer it from nonverbal behavior. To begin, the 
child is shown a picture of an agent (Linda) and asked to guess which of two locations contains a 
target object (a cat). For example, the child is shown a picture of some bushes and a garage, and 
is asked where the cat is hiding. Whatever answer the child gives, he is told that Linda thinks the 
cat is in the other location. The child is then asked where Linda will look for the cat, and is 
counted as passing the task if he gives an answer contrary to his own initial guess. Most 
mentalistic interpretations of this task see it as demonstrating a capacity to represent a belief 
contrary to one’s own. However, it is also possible that the child takes the experimenter to be 
knowledgeable, and hears the contrary suggestion as a tip about the location of the cat, 
prompting an update of the primary representation of the scenario (Westra & Carruthers, 2017). 
To test this hypothesis, instead of asking children about Linda’s likely action, the experimenter 
could instead give them a chance to “search for the cat” themselves at this juncture (perhaps by 
lifting a flap). If they search in the place associated with Linda, then their success in the task 
does not demonstrate a capacity to hold contrary contents in mind at the same time: The report 
about Linda has changed the child’s mind, and at the moment of test the child no longer has a 
primary representation contrary to the one associated with Linda. If this prediction holds up, then 
nonfactive mentalizing is not needed to pass this task. To establish that factive mentalizing is 
needed, one might check whether children respond differently to tips from experimenters who 
are reliable and those who are unreliable, building on the novel word-learning paradigm. 
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Beyond these specific predictions, our model also yields one very major prescription: 
Researchers interested in the role of mentalizing in communication should pay closer attention to 
the distinction between factive and nonfactive mentalizing. Although this distinction is often 
elided in practice, whether we frame a claim about mentalizing in terms of knowledge attribution 
or belief attribution has significant implications for the underlying cognitive processes involved. 
Thus, when researchers describe a sociocognitive phenomenon as “true belief attribution” when 
they really mean “knowledge attribution”, they are inadvertently invoking a more complex and 
executively demanding set of cognitive mechanisms with a distinct set of conversational 
functions, thereby making their underlying claims less plausible. By the same token, researchers 
who refuse to characterize a communicative process in terms of mentalizing on the grounds that 
it need not involve decoupling risk oversimplifying the sophistication and representational 
richness of our efficient epistemic tracking abilities. Even without decoupling, speakers and 
listeners are still in a position to grasp the propositional contents of each other’s mental states – a 





17 Thanks to Peter Carruthers, John Michael, and Timothy Williamson for their comments on earlier versions of this 
paper. 
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Mindreading – the process of attributing mental states to some target agent; also known as mentalizing 
Factive mental state – a state of mind of a type that binds agents only to truths (e.g. knowledge) 
Nonfactive mental state – a state of mind of a type that binds agent to true or false propositions (e.g. 
belief) 
Fact  - a true proposition 
Complement – the propositional content embedded under a mental state verb, either as a declarative 
(that-) clause or an interrogative (wh-) clause 
Primary representation – an agent’s model of reality, which may incorporate other agents and their 
mental states 
Decoupled representation – an agent’s representation of the content of another agent’s state of mind, 
quarantined from the agent’s primary representation of reality 
Mode of presentation – the description under which something is grasped, for example when the planet 
Venus is seen as either the Morning Star or the Evening Star 
Gettier case – a case in which an agent has justified true belief without knowledge, for example because 
they have a contingently veridical hallucination 
Egocentric ignorance – a situation in which the observed agent is taken to know something that the 
observer does not know 
Epistemic territory (of an agent) – a set of topics on which the agent is by default treated as 
knowledgeable 
 
 
 
 
